News

Brown Bag Seminar Series

18.02.2021

As part of our Brown Bag Seminar Series, on February 18 we hosted Dr. Papatya Duman. Dr. Duman presented her co-authored article titled “Non-cohesive TU-games: Efficiency and Duality” in our online seminar. In the article, the authors discuss how collaborations in coalition games can share the value they create. They redefine the concepts of feasibility, efficiency, and duality under the concept of consistency, criticizing the usual assumption in the "Transferable Utility Games (TU)" literature that the grand coalition is referenced as the most profitable outcome, meaning that everyone is in a single coalition. They based their TU games on Pareto efficiency and the most productive coalition structures rather than referencing the grand coalition. In this context, the study discusses how the gain vectors of coalition members should be formed. 

Making three different definitions of feasibility and efficiency, Dr. Duman classified two of these definitions as achievable outcome and ideal outcome. Since the other definition was made under the concept of grand coalition, Dr. Duman drew attention to an interesting point in her discussions that the set defined under the ideal outcome class could be an addition that distinguishes it from the “classical TU games” by allowing coalition members to work under different coalitions as well. Emphasizing this divergence, Duman showed the participants how much progress they have made in future research issues and gave the participants a clue about their future publications.